

Other worlds, other ontologies: The climate crisis as a driving force in Brazilian thought*

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Abstract

Questo articolo presenta brevemente alcune riflessioni su come la crisi climatica e l'impegno con la conoscenza indigena stiano contribuendo a una rilettura critica di alcune categorie del canone filosofico occidentale, in particolare la nozione di «mondo». A tal fine, delineiamo le idee chiave di un'opera provocatoria del pensatore brasiliano Marco Antonio Valentim, come proposto nel suo libro del 2020, *Extramundandade e Sobrenatureza: Ensaios sobre Ontologia Infundamental* [*Estramundandade e sobranatura: saggi sull'ontologia infondata*]. In tal modo, intendo dimostrare che la valorizzazione delle cosmologie amerindiane evidenzia l'animismo come una forma legittima di pensiero, un tema che è diventato sempre più presente nel discorso filosofico brasiliano contemporaneo.

Parole chiave: crisi climatica; pensiero brasiliano; estramundandade; soprannatura; ontologia.

This article briefly presents some reflections on how the climate crisis and the engagement with Indigenous knowledge are contributing to a critical rethinking of certain categories within the Western philosophical canon – particularly the notion of «world». To this end, we outline key ideas from a provocative work by Brazilian thinker Marco Antonio Valentim, as proposed in his 2020 book *Extra mundanity and Supernature: Essays on Unfundamental Ontology*. In doing so, I intend to demonstrate that the valorisation of Amerindian cosmologies highlights animism as a legitimate form of thought, a theme that has become increasingly present in contemporary Brazilian philosophical discourse.

Keywords: climate crisis; Brazilian thought; extra mundanity; supernature; ontology.

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1. Introduction

In 1943, Uruguayan artist Joaquín Torres García created the artwork *America Invertida* (Inverted America) as a symbol of the School of the South Manifesto, which declared: «Our North is the South»¹. The piece is a pen drawing of an «inverted» map, with the South placed at the top, expressing dissatisfaction with the Mercator projection – a dominant cartographic convention that positions the economically and politically dominant North above the subordinated and colonized South in world maps. Indeed, the concepts of North and South are conventions. There is no scientific basis for placing the North at the top and the South at the bottom of world maps. In medieval maps, for example, orientation (as the term suggests) was toward the East, with Asia occupying the upper part of the map. Torres García's work affirms the power of art in discussions of colonialism and coloniality. By inverting the map of South America and erasing North America, Torres García calls for a re-examination of our history, culture, and thought from our own perspective – subverting the paradigm imposed by colonial powers.

Since colonization, Latin America has mirrored the standards of the global North, which is seen as synonymous with progress, power, and authority. In this distorted reflection, we Latin Americans have learned to see ourselves as peripheral, as shadows of a foreign centre. This inverted cartography is not merely a spatial reversal – it is a philosophical, cultural, and political statement. It is an act of liberating territory from the symbolic dominance of the North, of reconfiguring the landscape of thought.

In Brazil's specific case, the *Anthropophagic Manifesto* (1928) by modernist poet Oswald de Andrade is a philosophical, political, and aesthetic provocation that proposes national culture as a process of devouring, digesting, and transforming what comes from outside: «Against all catechisms. And against the mother of the Gracchi. I'm only interested in what is not mine. Man's law. The anthropophagic law»². This manifesto not only offers a way to understand how Brazilians transform the cultural impositions of the global North but also reveals the poet's insights that gave rise to his writings on the philosophy of history and culture, proposing symbolic anthropophagy as a worldview (*Weltanschauung*)³.

Drawing on this Latin American intellectual ancestry, the present article briefly reflects on how the climate crisis and the engagement with Indigenous knowledge are contributing to a critique of certain categories within the Western philosophical canon – particularly the notion of «world». To do so, I present key ideas from a provocative

¹ C. Vicuña e E. Livon-Grosman (eds.), *The Oxford Book of Latin American Poetry*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, p. 107.

² O. de Andrade, *O manifesto antropófago*, in G. Mendonça Teles, *Vanguarda européia e modernismo brasileiro: apresentação e crítica dos principais manifestos vanguardistas*, Vozes, Petrópolis 1976.

³ See O. de Andrade, *A crise da filosofia messiânica*, in O. de Andrade, *Obras completas. V. VI. Do Pau-Brasil à antropofagia e às utopias*, Civilização Brasileira, São Paulo 1970.

work by Brazilian thinker Marco Antonio Valentim, as proposed in his 2020 book *Extra mundanity and Supernature: Essays on Unfundamental Ontology*. This book offers a powerful example of the strength of Brazilian thought in addressing one of the major issues of our time and the role of philosophy in this context.

2. *The Environmental Crisis as a Driving Force of Thought*

In Brazil, the effort to think with the Earth – or more precisely, to understand how Indigenous peoples conceive certain relational categories of existence – has become a necessary philosophical endeavour. For some time now, scholars in the humanities have recognized that imagining a viable future and a habitable planet requires valuing the modes of existence and the relationships Indigenous communities maintain with what we conventionally call «nature».

In this same vein, debates surrounding the climate crisis and the concept of the Anthropocene have transcended the boundaries of the natural sciences and become central topics within the humanities. Brazilian thinkers such as Déborah Danowski, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, and Marco Antonio Valentim have revitalized discussions on ecology and philosophy, opening a new field of research in Brazil that engages with intellectuals from both the Global South and North who are concerned with the future of human and non-human existence.

In this sense, the discussion of Anthropocene has not only captured the attention of climate scientists and natural science scholars – it has also inaugurated a new way of thinking about humanity, the planet, and the very notion of historical time. As Indian intellectual Dipesh Chakrabarty notes in his first thesis from *The Climate of History*, «Anthropogenic explanations of climate change spell the collapse of the Aged-old humanist distinction between natural history and human history»⁴. By naming the era in which human activity has become a geological force capable of altering Earth's systems, the concept of the Anthropocene renders the environmental crisis both visible and inescapable threatening the conditions for human life in the near future. More than a scientific observation, the discussion about Anthropocene in the humanities proposes a political and epistemological reinvention of the ways we exist on Earth. As Bruno Latour⁵ emphasizes, it is not merely a technical diagnosis but a call to reorganize our ways of knowing and acting. The debate over the term and its acceptance reveals deep tensions between different worldviews and the divisions that have underpinned Western science since the Enlightenment – especially the separation between nature and culture. Throughout modernity, a dichotomy was established: nature as an objective domain governed by universal laws, independent of human action; culture as a subjective realm shaped by symbols, institutions, and

⁴ D. Chakrabarty, *The Climate of History: Four Theses*, in «Critical Inquiry», 35, n. 2, 2009, pp. 197-222: 201.

⁵ B. Latour, *Anthropology at the Time of the Anthropocene. A personal View of what is to be Studied*, in M. Brightman, J. Lewis (eds.), *The Anthropology of Sustainability*, Palgrave, London 2017, pp. 35-51.

meanings created by humans. This split was foundational to scientific progress but also reflected a worldview that isolates humans from the rest of the planet.

In the book *The Ends of the World*, Danowski and Viveiros de Castro reflect on «the end of the world» discourses that gained traction following scientific recognition of the climate crisis. The authors draw from science, Amerindian cosmologies, anthropology, and philosophy to explore how different cultures conceptualize the end and what might come after. They interpret these discourses as thought experiments that signal a turning point in Western anthropological trajectories – toward decline and a loss of future. They highlight how psychological shock and a sense of disconnection in the face of climate predictions affect our collective imagination, which, amid ruins and anguish, attempts to forge a thought capable of reflecting on the present: a present in which the future no longer appears as a horizon, but as a riddle. In the book, indigenous worldviews offered as alternative ontologies to overcome the Nature vs. Culture binary.

What we could call «natural world», or «world» for short, is for Amazonian peoples a multiplicity of intricately connected multiplicities. Animal and other species are conceived as so many kinds of «people» or «societies», that is, as political entities. It is not «the jaguar» that is «human»; it is individual jaguars that take on a subjective dimension (more or less relevant according to the practical context of interaction with them) when they are perceived as having «behind» them a society, a collective political alterity⁶.

The growing interest among Brazilian scholars in Indigenous thought has transformed philosophical approaches to anthropological themes. Core philosophical concepts in the West – such as world, humanity, and nature – are now also being considered through indigenous discourse. Furthermore, there is a movement to value Indigenous thought among scholars.

In *Ideas to Postpone the End of the World*⁷, Brazilian Indigenous thinker Ailton Krenak shares the Krenak cosmivision regarding human-nature relations. He emphasizes that a specific kind of human – the industrialized Westerner from the Global North – is destroying the conditions for human existence. Krenak challenges the notion of a universal and homogeneous humanity, asserting that there are many worlds within the world, many ways of being human on this planet. For him, the violence and inequality faced by Indigenous peoples expose the fragility of the concept of humanity. He reminds us of the conflicts and tensions traditional communities face in defending their ways of life against the modern and colonial directives of our economic system. Precisely because traditional practices among Indigenous peoples, quilombolas, riverine and coastal communities presuppose an understanding of the interdependence among living beings, they reveal alternative conceptions of the world.

⁶ D. Danowski, E. Viveiros de Castro, *The Ends of the World*, Polity Press, New York 2016, pp. 68-69.

⁷ A. Krenak, *Ideas to postpone the End of the World*, Anansi, Toronto 2020.

The idea that multiple worlds exist is understood by Brazilian Indigenous people not only as the production of meaning through shared human symbols, but more profoundly as the recognition that other living entities possess their own perspectives, communities, and «worlds». In this regard, Marco Antonio Valentim's *Extra mundanity and Supernature: Essays on Infundamental Ontology* reveals the transformative power of philosophical provocation that seeks to break with the centrality of the human in constructing the meaning of the world – drawing from the perspectives of Indigenous peoples in Brazil. Grounded in robust anthropological and philosophical studies, Valentim invites us to journey through Indigenous thought in contrast to Heideggerian philosophy.

3. *Thinking Other Ways of Thinking*

In the prologue of his book, «Nature-1», Marco Antonio Valentim introduces the foundational premises of his work, beginning with the assertion: «our world is ceasing to be Kantian»⁸. This premise unfolds across multiple layers, the most evident being the unsustainability of philosophical neutrality in the face of the catastrophic scenario announced by the Anthropocene. More precisely, it raises the question: to what extent has philosophy, through its ontological and ethical postulates, contributed to the current planetary crisis?

Western modern thought, grounded in the promise of reason as an emancipatory force capable of organizing the world and the subject within a universal ethical and cognitive structure, has excluded other forms of rationality that do not align with its ideals. Kant, in particular, embodies the philosophical utopia that posits the neutrality of reason, the autonomy of the moral subject, and the separation between nature and freedom. These postulates are now crumbling under the weight of the unsettling transformations heralded by ecological catastrophes and mass extinctions. This compels us to question the consequences of the dictates of reason as articulated by modern philosophy.

According to Chakrabarty⁹, the Anthropocene dissolves the boundaries of modern thought by revealing the convergence of historical and physical temporalities. Building on this idea, Valentim proposes that «having postulated the fundamental disconnection between historical time and physical time, the “philosophers of freedom” unintentionally forged the spiritual foundation through which “humans became geological agents”»¹⁰. The notion of a separation between historical and physical time reflects the presumed divide between humanity and nature – one of the cornerstones of modern thought.

To elaborate on this proposition, Valentim critically examines another foundational idea of modernity: the existence of a being of consciousness. This being,

⁸ M.A. Valentim. *Extramundandade e Sobrenatureza: Ensaios de Ontologia Infundamental*, Cultura e Barbárie, Florianópolis 2018, p. 21.

⁹ D. Chakrabarty, *The Climate of History: Four Theses*, cit.

¹⁰ M.A. Valentim. *Extramundandade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 21.

although susceptible to modification by the «world of things», would, if that world were annihilated, «*its own existence would not be touched*»¹¹. Valentim argues that the very idea of an external world – one that only emerges insofar as it appears to consciousness and can be «bracketed» to reach the structure of pure consciousness – constitutes an ontological erasure of other worlds.

If one considers it in light of its immanent impact on other peoples – human and non-human – who have always been excluded and subjected to the production of «meaning in general», it becomes difficult to escape the evidence that transcendental thought operates as a device of ontological annihilation. Though positioned as an adversary of onto-theo-logy, the modern thesis of the «metaphysical isolation of man» is, at once, both ethnocidal and ecocidal¹².

Heidegger's postulate of the «metaphysical isolation of man» illustrates the dominant worldview in modern thought, which stripped nature and non-human beings of ontological dignity. It assumes the superiority of the human – the being conscious of its own existence and death – as something fundamentally separate from the world and from the non-human lives that inhabit it. In the book *The Ends of the World*, Deborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro remind us that this separation between human and non-human, between culture and nature, is a historical and philosophical construction deeply rooted in Western modern thought.

Modern anthropocentrism or humanism, therefore, corresponds to the «us before the world» scheme, a position of transcendental anteriority of the human which is all the more constitutive of this world the more humans, as empirical beings, show themselves to be constituted by it¹³.

The consequences of this anthropocentric *Weltanschauung* (worldview) indicate that philosophical thought is not neutral regarding the cultural outcomes of our civilization. Therefore, other ways of understanding, perceiving, and relating to reality – ways that have long been excluded from the Western philosophical canon – are now attracting the attention of scholars in the humanities.

Anthropocene not only exposes the failure of this separation, but also demands a radical revision of the ontological assumptions that place humanity at the centre and as the measure of all things. Valentim invites us to consider alternative cosmologies – especially those of Amerindian peoples – that do not operate with the same rigid distinction between nature and culture. In these worldviews, non-human beings (animals, rivers, mountains, spirits) possess agency, intentionality, and even subjectivity. In other words, they are treated as persons, not as objects. This perspective directly challenges Heidegger's «metaphysical isolation of man», which,

¹¹ E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to e Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, Nijhoff, The Hague 1983, p. 110.

¹² M.A. Valentim. *Extramundandidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 23.

¹³ D. Danowski, E. Viveiros de Castro, *The Ends of the World*, cit., p. 29.

despite his critique of traditional metaphysics, still maintains the human as the only being capable of understanding Being itself.

4. *Extra mundanity and Supernature*

In *Extra mundanity and Supernature: Essays on Infundamental Ontology*, Marco Antonio Valentim reflects on the possibility of worlds that are not organized around the human, nor do they recognize the human as their centre or measure. To explore this, Valentim challenges the philosophical tradition that subjects the cosmos to human reason and proposes an openness to realities that escape anthropocentric logic.

With the notion of extra mundanity – something akin to *Außerweltlichkeit* – it is proposed that the limits of what «is» do not coincide with those of the existentially formed world (*Welt*). Far from signifying the purely and simply ineffable, the extramundane is a possible name for that which has no place within fundamental ontology – an «ontological» character that is not determined *a priori* by the human project of being, the being-in-the-world¹⁴.

By defining the extramundane – or even by adopting that term – Valentim engages directly with Heidegger and his fundamental ontology. In this context, the extramundane is understood as that which surpasses the anthropocentric concept of the intramundane, attributed to nature in Heidegger's existential analytic, particularly in relation to the *Dasein's* constitution of world-meaning. For Heidegger, only *Dasein* can be full or lacking in meaning¹⁵ and only *Dasein* is history¹⁶. In this sense, nature exists solely as a structure of human existence, and history is constitutive of *Dasein*. This position reveals what Valentim calls the «ontological imbalance between nature and history»¹⁷ within Heideggerian philosophy.

According to Heidegger, non-human beings lack their own historicity. They are entities that simply exist, without any openness to Being. This theoretical construction seems to carve a deep divide between humans and non-humans. On one hand, history is the expression of human freedom and finitude; on the other, non-human beings are merely the silent backdrop of existence.

As Valentim observes, *Being and Time* barely addresses the phenomenon of life, and when it does, «Heidegger tends to reduce it to being-in-the-world, without considering its possible originality as an irreducibly distinct phenomenon»¹⁸. This makes it clear that, for Heidegger, life is not understood as a broad phenomenon – one that not only sustains the conditions for planetary existence but also possesses ontological dignity independent of human existence. In other words, the importance

¹⁴ M.A. Valentim. *Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 161.

¹⁵ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, State University of New York Press, New York 1996.

¹⁶ M. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington-Indianapolis 1995.

¹⁷ M.A. Valentim. *Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 41.

¹⁸ Ivi, p. 44.

of life in *Being and Time* is confined to the human being. Valentim points to Heidegger's exclusion of the living dimension of existence, including nonhuman beings and the vitality of nature itself, from the structure of fundamental ontology.

A critical analysis of Heidegger's philosophy reveals how deeply our philosophical thought is saturated with theoretical constructions that disregard the ontological relevance of non-human beings, of life as a phenomenon (with Hans Jonas as a rare exception within the tradition), and even of non-Western human others. Valentim approaches the anthropological dimension of Heidegger's fundamental ontology not as a question of some supposed human essence, but rather as a form of thought that expresses a political stance toward other peoples – both human and non-human.

To address the anthropological dimension of fundamental ontology would mean investigating what kind of relationship it virtually maintains, as the discourse of a «historical people», with other peoples – especially those deemed «uncommon» or supposedly non-philosophical. What the philosopher conceives as the «essence of man» emerges as the emblem of a situation that is not strictly epochal, determinable in terms of historicity as the ontological character of the human *Dasein* «in general», but rather a cosmopolitical situation [...], constituted by the original difference between historical humanity and other (extra-)human peoples¹⁹.

Valentim demonstrates how Heidegger's fundamental ontology positions itself as the voice of a «historical people», often excluding other ways of being and knowing. For Heidegger, these «other» peoples and their practices are considered primitive, referred to as *primitives Dasein* and *mythisches Dasein* in various instances throughout his work. The Heideggerian thesis suggests that so-called «primitive» peoples exhibit a pre-phenomenological character in their discourses, due to their original immersion in lived experience, that makes them incapable of conceptualizing it as a phenomenon. As a result, they are seen as lacking the objectivity required to grasp the philosophical and scientific world. This lack of objectivity does not imply that «primitive peoples» are excluded from the basic conditions of being-in-the-world, but rather places them in a hierarchical and colonial relation to the «people of philosophy», the people of historicity. Heidegger's ontology, despite its radical rethinking of being, still reproduces a colonial logic by positioning non-Western or non-philosophical peoples as ontologically inferior.

The *primitive Dasein* is the one and same being-in-the-world, yet grasped in the mode of being deprived of the possibility of explicitly announcing its own worldliness. Given the original nexus between the understanding of being and being-in-the-world, this means that the 'primitive' world is incapable of ontological self-determination.²⁰

¹⁹ Ivi, pp. 120-121.

²⁰ Ivi, p. 128.

Heidegger's framework positions «primitive» peoples as lacking the ability to articulate their own world in ontological terms because they are seen as incapable of expressing it conceptually. This exposes a dark side of philosophy: it can encode hierarchies even while claiming universality.

Another fundamental thesis in *Being and Time* that claims universality is also seen as problematic: namely, the idea of the «metaphysical isolation of man»²¹, caused by the «forgetfulness of being» within traditional metaphysics. According to Valentim, this thesis articulates «a certain original cosmopolitical position»²², which establishes a divide between humanity and non-humanity – and even between a particular kind of historical humanity and the primitive *Dasein*. It is no coincidence that Valentim reminds us of Lévi-Strauss's observation that there exists an «equivalence between the notion of history and the notion of humanity which some have tried to foist on us with the unavowed aim of making historicity the last refuge of a transcendental humanism»²³, even though Heidegger himself critiques traditional humanism. Thus, the establishment of this divide between worlds configures «the same myth – the myth of philosophy – which institutes the 'arch-division' between historicity and primitivity»²⁴.

In an effort to move beyond such theses, the concept of Extra mundanity seeks to explore alternative perspectives and non-hegemonic modes of thought regarding the relationships between worlds – understood here as distinct centres of cultural and meaning production. As Valentim notes, «Western thought on being, in its hegemonic strands, lacks a concept of meaning capable of operating beyond the anthropocentric perspective»²⁵.

By engaging with Indigenous cosmologies – which encompass the viewpoints of other humans, non-humans, and spirits – extra mundanity undertakes the philosophical exercise of imagining multiple realities. This concept investigates a form of ontological understanding that transcends the ethnocentric and anthropocentric centrality of Western rationality. Valentim draws not only from philosophical traditions but also from Amerindian thought and anthropological insights to reflect on the social relations between humans and non-humans.

An illuminating example of Valentim's line of thought appears in a passage that highlights the contrast between the symbolic logic of Greek myths and that of Amerindian ones.

The divergence between pre-philosophical Greece and Indigenous America regarding the origin and status of the symbolic helps explain why Greek mythology, in its effort to establish cosmic order through a kind of global teleology, narrates complex intrigues among entirely new «characters» called gods – figures endowed

²¹ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, cit.

²² M.A. Valentim, *Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 142.

²³ C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1966, p. 262.

²⁴ M.A. Valentim. *Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 143.

²⁵ Ivi, p. 161.

with a much more stable symbolic identity – who vie for actual sovereignty. In contrast, Amerindian myth presents us with metamorphoses of beings and characters, through which what we consider «natural» and «cultural» entities become entangled, allowing for constant transitions from the natural or mundane to the supernatural or supramundane²⁶.

This contrast is striking: Greek myth tends to stabilize symbolic identities to found order, while Amerindian myth dissolves boundaries through transformation, embracing fluidity between worlds. Valentim's insight here is not just anthropological - it's ontological. He's showing how different cosmologies encode radically different ways of being. The way the symbolic is structured in Amerindian societies serves as a starting point for a critical reflection on the anthropocentric logic of Western thought – a mental experiment that explores alternative ways of thinking about existence on Earth. The notion of supernature, intrinsically tied to the concept of Amerindian perspectivism developed by anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, is adopted by Valentim to refer to the relationships between humans and non-humans as described by Amazonian Indigenous peoples.

According to Viveiros de Castro²⁷, Amazonian cosmologies share the idea that humanity is the «original common condition» of cosmic agents. Valentim emphasizes the stark contrast between Western anthropocentrism and Amerindian anthropomorphism. While «the former is characterized by the radical de-subjectivation of non-human beings in favour of the constitution of humanity as a 'supreme realm,' the latter is explained by the possibility of the full subjectivation of beings»²⁸. Here, the concept of humanity does not refer to an essence, but rather to an «enunciative position»²⁹ that can also be occupied by non-humans.

Amerindian perspectivism, therefore, proposes an ontological shift: instead of a fixed boundary between human and nonhuman, there is a fluidity of subject positions. Instead of fixed essences and binary logic, we encounter a world of fluid identities and contested subject positions – where «humanity» is not a given, but a role negotiated among beings. This is the Amerindian way of signifying what it is to be a subject in a world of many worlds.

On the ontological plane, the presumed substances (*ousiai*) are marked by irreducible instability, always constituted provisionally through the ongoing divergence of perspectival subjects who contend for the cosmological position of the human³⁰.

In this context, the notion of supernature refers to a zone of indiscernibility between nature and culture – a space where spirituality, non-human beings, and

²⁶ Ivi, p. 144.

²⁷ E. Viveiros de Castro, *Os pronomes cosmológicos e o perspectivismo ameríndio*, in «Revista Maná», 2, n. 2, 1996, pp. 115-144.

²⁸ M.A. Valentim, *Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 191.

²⁹ E. Viveiros de Castro, *Os pronomes cosmológicos e o perspectivismo ameríndio*, cit.

³⁰ M.A. Valentim, *Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 177.

humans are deeply intertwined. Supernature thus transcends the boundaries of modern reason, opening the way for an expanded cosmology that understands existence as a multiplicity that is simultaneously material and spiritual, without dichotomies.

Valentim interprets the idea of supernature from Viveiros de Castro as «the category that signals the cosmological function of the trans-species unity of spirit»³¹. For Amazonian Indigenous peoples, entities and forces that inhabit the world in non-visible ways are real and active - cosmological agents who are acknowledged within their cosmopolitical relations. In this way, culture and nature are not understood as «ontological provinces», but rather as «interchangeable perspectives and positional-relational contexts»³². The author emphasizes that the cosmopolitical character of Amerindian metaphysics is «radically un-fundamental», insofar as «the meaning of being in general is decided in the supernatural encounter between multiple persons or ‘centres of intentionality»³³. There is, therefore, no foundation or point of origin – only relations.

Hence the oxymoron proposed by the author in the subtitle of his book: *un-fundamental* ontology – a form of thought that rejects the foundational assumptions traditionally presupposed by ontology and seeks to be affected by other worlds, a thought that transforms through contact with diverse realities. In other words, this is not simply an alternative ontology, but an altered thinking – one that enables the emergence of an ontological plurality, where there is no longer a universal being, but multiple forms of being held in tension.

5. Final considerations

The theoretical stance taken by Valentim – and by the other thinkers referenced here – generates a series of implications, whether critical or not, by removing the human being from the centre of philosophical reflection. It allows other modes of existence – non-human, spiritual, collective – to be considered legitimate subjects of philosophical inquiry. The valorisation of Amerindian discourse on world-understanding and cosmology highlights animism not as a primitive belief, but as a form of thought. Valentim’s articulation of Amerindian perspectivism demonstrates that this worldview constitutes a relational ontology that maps cosmopolitical relations. Instead of fixed categories, we encounter a dynamic interaction of positions—subjectivity is not limited to humans, as evidenced by the very grammar of pronouns used by these peoples to refer to non-human beings.

More than a provocation to Western thought, what is at stake is the recognition that certain categories within our philosophical tradition share responsibility for shaping a worldview that has led us into a planetary crisis. Valentim does not propose

³¹ E. Viveiros de Castro, *A inconstância da alma selvagem e outros ensaios de antropologia*, Cosac Naify, São Paulo 2002, p. 396.

³² Ivi, p. 47.

³³ M.A. Valentim. *Extramundandade e Sobrenatureza*, cit., p. 180.

a new ontology; rather, he proposes a new philosophical attitude: a philosophy that listens, that allows itself to be affected, that decentralizes itself. It is a philosophy that does not seek to dominate the world, but to inhabit worlds. His work suggests a cosmopolitical ethos that acknowledges plural worlds, interconnected through contagion, and a political emergence that includes spirits, animals, and humans as participants. This constitutes a theoretical attitude that manifests as a politics attuned to cosmologies that escape hegemonic frameworks – offering a philosophical response to the anthropocentrism that has fuelled the contemporary ecological crisis.